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"To Discountenance the Haughty and the Lawless" - The Ethics of
Dealing with Bad Clients
By Don Burnett
Lawyers face hard choices-not only between right and wrong,
but also between right and right. For example, it is "right" for a
lawyer to be loyal to a client; but it is also "right" for a lawyer to
protect others from harm, to serve conscientiously as an officer of
the legal system, and to pursue justice. When these "rights"
conflict with each other, how should the lawyer choose?
The newly amended Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct,
effective July 1, 2004, clarify how these conflicting "rights" must
be prioritized, or accommodated to each other, in specific
situations. The 2004 amendments place increased emphasis upon
a lawyer's obligations to society and to the legal system, vis -vis
duties to clients, The Rules reaffirm the noble calling of the law as
a learned profession dedicated to public service, in contrast to the
cultural stereotype of lawyers as mercenaries. The amended Rules
echo the spirit of the now-famous letter written by a young John
Adams to his friend Jonathan Sewall, in which the budding lawyer
and future president declaimed:
Now to what higher object, to what greater character,
can any mortal aspire than to be possessed of all this
knowledge, well digested and ready at command, to
assist the feeble and friendless, to discountenance the
haughty and lawless, to procure redress to wrongs, the
advancement of right, to assert and maintain liberty and
virtue, to discourage and abolish tyranny and vice?"
Sadly, but inevitably, lawyers throughout history have
encountered people, including their own clients, who are "haughty
and lawless"-who expect lawyers to help them lie, cheat, or steal.
This, of course, is not the proper role of lawyers; and it never has
been. As long ago as 1908, when the ABA adopted the Canons of
Professional Ethics, lawyers were understood to be more than the
educated tools of their clients. In Canon 15 ("How Far a Lawyer
May Go in Supporting a Client's Cause") the ABA stated:
The office of the attorney does not permit, much less
does it demand of him for any client, violation of law or
any manier of fraud or chicane. Hc must obey his own
conscience and not that of his client.
Canon 16 ("Restraining Clients from Improprieties") imparted
a similar message:
A lawyer should use his best efforts to restrain and
prevent his clients from doing those things which the
lawyer himself ought not to do.... If a client persists in
such wrongdoing, the lawyer should terminate their
relation."
TIbday, the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct are restoring
and strengthening these venerable precepts. In particular, the
Rules provide (a) that a lawyer must decline, or must terminate,
the representation of any client who seeks the lawyer's assistance in
committing a crime or fraud; (b) that a lawyer is authorized to
disclose confidential information if necessary to prevent
reasonably certain physical harm to others or serious harm to an
organizational client; and (c) that the lawyer must speak truthfully
and may not abide false statements by others.- Consider the
following illustrations:
A. Refusing to be Part of a Client's Crime or Fraud
" A prospective client comes to your office and asks you to
cteate a business corporation. In the course of the
conversation, it becomes clear to you that the corporation
will be a sham; it will have no assets or genuine business
operations, but will merely be a device to raise money from
gullible investors. Rule 1.2(d) states that a lawyer "shall not
counsel a client to engage, or assist a client, in conduct that
the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent...." This rule
interlocks with Rule 1.16(a), which provides that a lawyer
"shall not represent a client or, where representation has
commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a
client, if .. the representation will result in violation of the
rules of professional conduct or other law...." In the case of
the sham corporation, representing this prospective client
would violate Rule 1.2(d). Unless you were successful in
counseling the client to create a legitimate business entity,
you would be required to decline the representation.'
• Suppose the prospective client's criminal or fraudulent
intentions are not apparent at the outset; but you discover
them after the representation has begun and you have
provided legal services advancing the client's scheme. As
noted above, you must terminate the representation.
Moreover, the ABA has issued an advisory opinion stating
that whenever a lawyer must terminate a representation iii
order to avoid involvement in a crime or fraud, the lawyer
also may withdraw "noisily"-that is, the lawyer may
disaffirm his or her work product, such as documents the
lawyer has prepared and furnished to third parties, in
connection with the crime or fraud." Such a statement of
disaffirmance, without more, does not breach the lawyer's
duty to refrain from disclosing confidential information. The
disaffirmance may well induce third parties to raise questions
and to draw inferences; but in performs the salutary purpose
of disconnecting the lawyer, and the legal profession, from a
crime or fraud.
It also keeps the lawyer well clear of violating Rule 8.4 (c),
which prohibits any "conduct involving dishonestly, fraud,
deceit, or misrepresentation .
B. Preventing Harm to Persons or to Organizations
- In the course of representing a manufacturer, you learn that the
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client and several nearby enterprises are secretly discharging a
highly toxic pollutant into a stream from which the
community draws its water supply. Such information, acquired
in the course of a representation, is confidential under Rule
1.6. Under subsection (b) of the Rule, however, confidentiality
is subject to exceptions. The current version of Rule 1.6(b)
provides that a lawyer may reveal protected information "to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary
1. to prevent the client from committing a crime,
including disclosure of the intention to commit a
crime; [or]
2. to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial
bodily harm...."
In the water pollution case, the first exception to
confidentiality would apply only if discharging the toxic
pollutant were a crime. The second exception would apply
more readily because it serves a broader purpose. Rather than
seeking to prevent crime, the second exception seeks to
prevent harm to physical wellbcing. Thus, the second
exception does not require the harm to be a product of
criminal conduct, or to be imminent (as opposed to
"reasonably certain"), or even to be caused by the client.
Rather, it is sufficient that the lawyer be aware of
circumstances and conduct threatening death or substantial
bodily harm. In this case, if you reasonably believe it
necessary to disclose the landowners' polluting practices in
order to alleviate the harm to the lives or health of inhabitants
of the community, you may make such a disclosure.
Now, suppose you become aware of conduct and
circumstances creating a risk of economic harm rather than
harm to physical wellbeing. If the economic harm arises from
the client's commission of a crime, disclosure will be
permissible under the first exception to Rule 1.6 and under
the following additional exception, which allows a lawyer to
disclose confidential information
3. to prevent, mitigate or rectify substantial injury to
the financial interests or property of another that is
reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the
client's commission of a crime in furtherance of
which the client has used the lawyers services
Although the first and third exceptions to Rule 1.6 look
similar, they differ in scope and focus. The scope of the first
exception includes any client crime, while the third
exception extends only to client crimes in which the lawyer's
services have been used. Moreover, the focus of the first
exception is upon future or ongoing crimes, while the third
exception focuses upon past crimes with future or ongoing
consequences that can be prevented, mitigated or rectified.
Notably, the ABA model version of the third exception
refers to "fraud" as well as to "crime," but Idaho has deleted
that reference. Consequently, if a potential harm is
economic rather than health-related, and if it arises from a
'fraud" that does not constitute a "crime," an Idaho lawyer
may not disclose confidential information in order to
alleviate the harm.
But here is a point some lawyers forget-and bad clients hope
you will forget. Adhering to confidentiality, does not fully
discharge your professional obligations. Under Rules 1.2(d)
and 1.16(a), as you will recall, you must withdraw from the
representation if your services are being used in a fraud; and
under the ABA advisory opinion mentioned above, your
withdrawal may be "noisy"
What if your client is an organization rather than an
individual? Rule 1.13 contains specific provisions governing
lawyers for organizations. Among these is a requirement that
the lawyer act "in the best interests of the organization'
whenever an officer, employee or other constituent of the
organization in a matter related to the lawyer's representation,
is violating the las, or causing the organization to do so,
thereby creating a risk of substantial injury to the
organization. If necessary, the lawyer's action will include
taking the issue to the highest authority in the organization,
such as a board of directors. Rule 1.13, however, merely
supplements-and does not displace-the organizational
lawyer's authority and responsibility under the other rules.v
Thus, if the organization faces possible liability for halrm to
others, the lawyer not only should act under Rule 1.1 3(b),
but also should consider whether the harm triggers an
exception to confidentiality under Rule 1.6(b).
Here, there are forks in the analytical road. If the harm relates
to physical health-like toxic pollutants in a community's
water supply-then the lawyer is permitted, as would be the
lawyer for any individual client, to make a disclosure in order
to prevent "reasonably certain death or substantial bodily
harm." If the harm is economic, and the conduct in question
is criminal, then the first and third exceptions to Rule 1.6(b)
also would allow disclosure, either to prevent future and
ongoing crimes, or to address future and ongoing
consequences of past crimes. But if the harn to others is
economic, and the conduct in question is fraudulent yet not
criminal. then the analysis is more nuanced.
The analysis begins by recognizing that even though a
particular fraud might not violate a criminal statute, it
nevertheless would constitute the violation of a legal
obligation, triggering an organizational lawyer's duty to act
Linder Rule 1.13(b). Although the lawyer could not disclose
confidential information under Idaho's exceptions to
confidentiality under Rule 1.6(b), there is now another
exception to confidentiality embedded in Rule 1.13 itself.
Subsection (c) of the Rule currently provides, in essence, that
if the lawyer's efforts to obtain corrective action within the
organization are unsuccessful, and if the lawyer "reasonably
believes that [a violation of law] is reasonably certain to result
in substantial injury to the organization," then the lawver
may reveal information otherwise protected under Rule 1.6.
Thus, Rule 1.13(c) contains a limited, periissive exception
to confidentiality for "whistleblowing."
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If you represent an organization, you may have to decide some
day whether to blow the whistle on an organizational fraud
related to the subject matter of your representation. Regardless
of how you resolve that question, however, remember that in
any event Rule 1.2(d) precludes you from participating in the
fraud (or in a crime). If your client does not cease its criminal
or fraudulent conduct, Rule 1.16(a) will require you to
withdraw from the representation. Even if you have chosen not
to disclose confidential information under Rule 1.13(c),
you still can make such a withdrawal "noisy' by disaffirming
any work product connected with the crime or fraud.
The organization may remain corrupt, but you will not
be corrupted.
Telling the Truth and Requiring Others to Do So
* You represcnt a client in a divorce proceeding. During a
deposition, the client provides what you know to be an
inaccurate description of assets subject to division in the
divorce. During a recess, your client says, "Maybe I didn't
mention everything, but ['11 straighten it out if we go to trial.
Wouldn't this be a good time to settle the case?" The answer,
of course, is, "No, it's a bad time-an unethical time. ' Rule
3.3 requires lawyers, as officers of the legal system, to be
candid toward a tribunal and to demand candor from others
as well. In an advisory opinion, the ABA has stated that
proceedings before tribunals are deemed to include discovery
proceedings. Accordingly, the duty of candor extends tO
depositions, and the ABA's opinion is now reflected in official
commentary to Rule 3.3. 7
Therefore, at trial, in any other kind of hearing, or in
discovery, a lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement
of fact or la, nor shall the lawyer offer evidence the lawyer
knows to be false.' If the lawyer learns of the falsity of
material evidence after it has been offered, but while the case
is still pending, the lawyer must "take reasonable remedial
measures, including, if necessary disclosure to the tribunal."
The key word here is "remedial." The lawyer must take action
that is timely and effective in correcting the falsehood. Under
subsection (c) of Rule 3.3, this duty' of disclosure trumps your
duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6.
In the case of the divorce deposition, you should begin-as
noted in the ABA opinion-by remonstrating with your
client about the false testimony. Usually, such a conversation
will convince the client that the falsehood is going to be
corrected and it will look better if he or she makes the
correction rather than leaving it to you. If the client is
intransigent, however, you must make a disclosure to the
other party(ics) or to the court, as appropriate to the
circumstances. Only when a material falsehood has been
corrected should settlement negotiations proceed.
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* Suppose a client's false statement occurs during a settlement
negotiation, or in the negotiation of a business transaction,
rather than in a deposition or a trial. In that event, Rule 3.3
is not implicated. Rather, the applicable standard is set forth
in Rule 4.1, which-in addition to providing that a lawyer
shall not knowingly make a false statement of material fact or
law to any third person-requires the lawyer to "disclose a
material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fiaudulent act by a client...." The Rule goes on
to say, however, that this duty-unlike the duty to correct a
falsehood in a proceeding before a tribunal-does not
override confidentiality , under Rule 1.6.
Thus, as a lawyer representing a client in any setting, you
must always speak truthfully. 'When falsehoods come from
your client or from others in a tribunal context, you should
correct the falsehoods; and your duty of candor will trump
confidentiality. But in other contexts, if the falsehoods can be
corrected only by disclosing confidential information, your
duty of confidentiality will trump candor. This contextual
differentiation of duties relating to disclosure illustrates the
difficulty of balancing "right v. right" when fundamental
values collide.
Resolving the confidentiality and disclosure issues, however,
will not end your professional responsibility. As we have seen
in the discussion of other dilemmas posed by bad clients,
Rules 1.2(d) and 1.16(a) require you to withdraw from any
representation in which your services are being used to assist
the client in a crime or fraud. In the case of a falsehood
uttered by the client in a negotiation, if the misrepresentation
is tantamount to a fraud, and if the client later insists that you
refrain from using confidential information to set the record
straight, you must withdraw; and you may do so noisily by
disaffirming any of your work product or prior statements
related to the fraud.
If the client's actions cause you to withdraw and disaffirm,
you should recognize that this is a client well worth losing.
And the legal profession shoild recognize that it has found in
you an ethical lawyer well worth keeping.
Ron Schilling
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ENDNOTES
I Quoted in David McCullough, John Adams (Simon & Schuster, 2001).
2 Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct will cause a lawyer to be subject
to professional discipline, which is different from malpractice liabilit. The
violation f a Rule "should not itself give rise to a cause ofaction against a lawyer
nor should it create any presumption in such a case that a legal duty has been
breached.... Nevertheless, since the Rules do establish standards ofconduct by
lawyers, a lawyer's violation of a Rule may be evidence ofbreach of the applicable
standard ofconduct," Idaho Rules (f Professional Conduct, "Preanble" para. 20.
3 Rule I 18, a new rule added in 2004, further addresses a lawyer's duties to a
prospective client. Even if the lawyer decclines the representation, the prospective
client (by analogy to a ftmer client) is entitled to protections relating to
confidentiality and conflicts of interest.
4 ,See NBA Formal Opinion 92-366 (American Bar Association Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibilitil 2002).
5 Comment 6 to Rule ].13 states, in part, "The authority and responsibility
provided in this Rule are concurrent with the authority and responsibility
provided in other Rules .... Paragraph (c) of this Rule supplements Rule i.6(b)
by providing an ar-ritiona/ basis upon which the lasw-er may reveal information
relating to the representation, but does not moditv, restrict, or limit the
provisions of Ruke 1,6(b)(1)-(6)." (Emphasis supplied.)
6Conment 3 to Rule 1,13 states that "when the lawyer knows that the
organization is likely to be substantially injured by action of an officcr o t/cr
constituent that violates a legal obligation to the organization or is in sioltion
of law that might be imputed to the organization, the lawyer mnus proceed is is
reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization."
7 See ABA Formal Opinion 93-376 (American Bar Association Comnnittec oi
Ethics and Professional Responsibiliy. 1993). Comment 10 to Rule 3.3
illustrates the application of the rule to ailse resrimoiy given by a client in a
dpo siiot.
8 Rule 3.3 applies to all lawyers and all eases, even to defense counsel in criminal
prosecutions. Comment 7 to the Rule cites the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Nix z1 Wihteside for the propositions (i) that a criminal defendant has so
onstirutional right to testi y isel, and (ii) that a lawyer does not render
ineectiVc assistance of counsel simply by refusing to participate in the
presentution of per tred testirrony. The comment also notes that a court may
allow a criminal defeindant to give narrative testimony without question-and-
answer participation by defense counsel. (The lawyer should not rcter to such
testimony in a closing statement, if the latyet knows the testimony was false.)
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